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Discussion After the Speeches of William Napoli, Jr.
and Donald A. McGrath
QUESTION, Professor King: In terms of funding ESOP's and profit
sharing plans, what are the various alternatives of keeping employees
satisfied?
ANSWER, Mr. McGrath: What behavioral psychologists have
done regarding benefits, at least for us in the business, is not a terribly
motivating factor. Benefits do head off dissatisfaction, but their existence
does not necessarily make me happy. What seems to do that is money.
When we look at the kinds of employee surveys that we have done, I
can look at a company, and tell the benefit planners where they ought to
be spending their benefit dollars based upon the age group of their
employees.
Younger people want cash, time-off work with pay, defined contri-
bution, defined pension plans and a savings plan that does not tie up their
money. As they get older they are more interested in life insurance, and
when it is too late, they become interested in pensions.
So, greater emphasis is being placed on both sides of the border for
performance and pay for performance. For example, some kind of flexi-
ble benefit scheme. Pay for performance that generates cash which then
can be used for other purposes. That is the motivator. People are not
going to join TPF and CN because of our pension plan.
I do not think that the people coming into the work force are going
to have these types of ambitions. They are going to be challenged by
money, their environment and by the kind of quality circling the Japa-
nese-style management where people are put into groups rather than a
hierarchial structure.
COMMENT, Mr. Napoli: In general, I agree. However, when peo-
ple have a lump sum available at retirement, they seem inclined to ask
themselves, "If I stay another year, how much is my lump sum value in
my pension claim?" They find that the lump sum value would actually
decrease if they stay.
There is not much incentive for continuing to work with a defined
contribution plan. A lump sum increases after the employee decides to
take a money benefit. It actually is a much larger benefit because it is
growing rather than declining in value. This may be more compatible
with trying to retain people at retirement. A company might also find
some way to allow defined medical plans to retain their value when em-
ployees reach later ages.
COMMENT, Mr. McGrath: Another reason this happens is be-
cause the value of a defined benefit pension decreases with age since it
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costs less to provide income. That is, the annuity value goes down as you
get older because the pension is going to be paid for in a shorter period of
time. The employee is still going to get the same number of dollars per
month, but if he is watching his accounts, they are decreasing in value.
QUESTION, Mr. Harwood: Are we talking about a flex plan?
ANSWER, Mr. McGrath: The group benefit practice, except in
Quebec, is indeed flex. The difficulties we have with flex are with smaller
average-sized employers. With Medicare, an employer can not down-
size its health program sufficiently to generate acceptable spending
credit. So, an employer who wants a flex plan must invest some seed
money to initially fund the spending account. There are a number of flex
plans, and we are working on three right now in the Toronto office.
COMMENT, Mr. Langmack: We had a company with a staff
union of four or five hundred employees, and we put in a profit sharing
plan. The union did not like it, but we put it in anyway. Each of our
employees knew this money was not available until they retired, how-
ever, the bank sent them a certificate each year stating how much money
they had in their plan. Soon, they discovered that they had more money
in the plan than they thought they would have.
In negotiating with the union, one of the main stumbling blocks was
how to recoup the money from the profit sharing plan. Finally we made
a suggestion: "We will give it to you on one condition, reduce the contri-
butions from ten percent of our profits to five percent of the profits." The
union took it like that. Of course, the older employees did not like it but
the younger did. We had more younger employees. As a result, the
profit sharing plan almost went out the window. In fact, it did. It went
from ten percent to five percent without anyone's knowledge.
Each year we had the same argument. The union wanted to take
that money out. Finally, we closed it out, and we paid them at five per-
cent and forgot all about profit sharing. Again, the older employees real-
ized that by being more productive, they increased the profits and got
more money. The younger did not realize this so it was not an incentive.
We thought it would do.
QUESTION, Ms. Jensen: Under ERISA, the state law really does
not have much effect. I am intrigued by your description of the Cana-
dian schemes. Is there any coordination among the provinces?
ANSWER, Mr. McGrath: That is one of the most interesting
problems that we do have. A few years ago there was something called
CAPSULE, which is the Canadian Association of Pension Superintend-
ents. The idea was to bring a degree of uniformity to the provincial legis-
lation. In addition to the provincial legislation, the federal government
also has a Pension Standards Act which applies to the Yukon in the
Northwest Territory, and to any industries which are regulated by the
federal government, such as banks.
In fact, it is difficult to reconcile the differences between the ten
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pieces of provincial pension legislation. So, the national employer really
has two choices: One is to treat its employees the same, no matter where
they are employed in Canada. This will maximize cost because the em-
ployer is equalizing the provinces, taking the best pieces of legislation
from each province.
The other choice is to follow only the requirements of the province
where a particular employee is employed. This will reduce costs, but the
employer is now treating its employees somewhat differently. Most com-
panies struggle to find some point between these two extremes and that is
not easily done.
QUESTION, Professor King: We live in a highly competitive world.
We compete against Germany and Japan and other power houses. How
do our costs stack up against these competitors?
ANSWER, Mr. McGrath: Much of their cost is hidden in things
like "Medicare" type of programs. There are differences in the way the
social benefits are delivered and financed. I suspect that European costs
for benefits and pay for time not worked are greater than in North
America.
Looking at Canada versus the United States, the U.S. Social Secur-
ity costs must be put into the equation. Considering Canada's pension
plan and our unemployment insurance, we are pretty close. There is a
feeling, however, that U.S. Medicare is highly subsidized by eighty-four
percent of government taxation; and our manufacturing industry is prob-
ably not subsidized because we are otherwise taxed to provide for it. Es-
sentially, Canada and the United States are providing roughly the same
kind of benefits, but in different forms.
QUESTION, Mr. O'Grady: The government has an incentive to en-
courage savings through pension plans. But, both Canada and the
United States seem to grudgingly give tax support. Is the existing level of
tax support for these programs sufficient?
ANSWER, Mr. McGrath: Certainly in Canada there is a lack of
savings. Greater tax support could encourage more saving. However,
we are in such miserable shape with the deficit that the government is
attempting to increase taxation in order to increase revenue; one way is
with tax support.
The Canadian government is caught in a bit of a bind. We have had
tax support pension plans for a long time, and now other benefits are also
being considered as a source of additional revenue.
QUESTION, Mr. O'Grady: Mr. McGrath, can you tell us how
much $1000 of RRSP costs the federal government in overall revenue?
ANSWER, Mr. McGrath: No. At an average marginal rate of tax,
forty percent, it will be $400 times the number of people who take it.
There are a lot of people in this program.
COMMENT, Mr. Napoli: In the United States, the largest source of
tax reductions, are deductions for pensions and medical benefits. Since it
3
: Discussion after the Speeches of William Napoli, Jr. and Donald A
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1990
136 CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL Vol. 16:133 1990
is the biggest source of deductions, it is hard for the government to ease
up in this area.
QUESTION, Ms. Jensen: Corporate America has been attempting
to have more say in how it is governed. I wonder if you were experienc-
ing any of this in Canada?
ANSWER, Mr. McGrath: No. Some corporations move towards
the ethical kind of investment because of employee pressure. For exam-
ple, employee pressure has persuaded some companies to discontinue in-
vestment in South Africa. Someone always turns up at annual meetings
of large banks with their small share of pension funds, and attempts to
actually influence the corporation.
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